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Abstract 
Much research on memory for binding depends on incidental measures. However, if 
encoding associations benefits from conscious attention, then incidental measures of 
binding memory might not yield a sufficient understanding of how binding is 
accomplished. Memory for letters and spatial locations was compared in three within-
participants tasks, one in which binding was not afforded by stimulus presentation, one in 
which incidental binding was possible, and one in which binding was explicitly to be 
remembered. Some evidence for incidental binding was observed, but unique benefits of 
explicit binding instructions included preserved discrimination as set size increased and 
drastic reduction in false alarms to lures that included a new spatial location and an old 
letter. This suggests that substantial cognitive benefits, including enhanced memory for 
features themselves, might occur through intentional binding, and that incidental 
measures of binding might not reflect these advantages. 
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Memory for binding: Comparing the effects of intentional goals and incidental 
affordances 
 Much research on binding, the grouping of otherwise unrelated features into a 
unified object, depends on inferences about incidental binding. Incidental binding 
describes evident memory for a relationship between features when learning that 
relationship was not an explicit task goal. Incidental binding is sometimes observed as the 
faster recognition of studied versus unstudied combinations of features or differences in 
blood flow during tasks where binding was afforded compared with tasks in which 
binding was implausible (Nyberg, Habib, McIntosh, & Tulving, 2000; Prabhakaran, 
Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000). Methods examining incidental rather than 
intentional binding are logically appealing because they allow direct comparisons 
between two recognition tasks, which can be identical except for the format of the 
stimulus presentation. These methods presume that some binding occurs without 
intention, and also that the processes underlying incidental binding are similar to those 
underlying intentional binding. I reconsider these presumptions, which are frequently 
assumed by researchers studying binding, by directly comparing behavioral performance 
on three similar tasks designed to differ in how strongly binding is afforded by the 
stimulus presentation and instructions. 
 One influential binding study was carried out by Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, 
and Gabrieli (2000). Prabhakaran et al. compared behavioral responses and BOLD 
activation between two conditions, one in which to-be-remembered letters were presented 
in a central location while to-be-remembered locations surrounded the letters (Separate) 
and another in which the letters were displayed occupying the locations (Bound). 
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Recognition decisions were the same in both tasks; after a brief delay, a single letter 
appeared on the screen, in a location, and participants were to respond affirmatively if 
both the probe letter and location were represented at study, and negatively if either the 
letter or location were not. This task did not require explicit memory for binding; 
memory for both feature dimensions was sufficient for correct responding. However, 
binding was possible in the Bound condition and some measures indeed suggested that 
binding occurred. In the Bound condition, positive probes could be congruent, including a 
letter and location presented together at study, or recombined, including two features 
from study presentation recombined from different letter-location pairs. Prabhakaran et al. 
found that participants responded significantly faster to congruent positive probes than to 
recombined ones, suggesting that participants remembered bindings. This inference 
allowed Prabhakaran et al. to interpret unique BOLD activation in the anterior prefrontal 
cortex during the Bound trials as evidence of a domain-general working memory store, 
capable of holding letter-location representations. This research was cited by Baddeley 
(2000) as key evidence leading to the supposition of the domain-general episodic buffer, 
which could conceivably store cross-domain object representations. 
 Despite the elegance of the incidental binding research design, it could be 
problematic to make inferences about processes and mechanisms underlying binding 
using a task that does not explicitly require binding. Other evidence suggests that binding 
does not necessarily occur whenever stimulus presentation affords it (e.g., Cowan, Saults, 
& Morey, 2006; Morey, 2009). For example, Morey (2009) compared memory for bound 
displays of letter-in-location stimuli, manipulating whether participants were always 
tested with a single feature or instead whether binding was tested. When binding was 
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never tested, articulatory suppression did not affect memory for spatial locations, but 
when binding was tested, articulatory suppression impaired performance even on trials in 
which a new, unstudied location (i.e., a location lure), was tested. This indicates that 
given the same study display, participants may remember features differently when 
binding is required. When attention is paid to binding at study, memory representations 
may differ compared to circumstances in which binding is ignored. 
 Whether attention is strictly necessary for remembering binding remains an open 
question (cf. Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002), one whose 
ultimate answer will be no doubt be influenced by the methods used to measure memory 
for binding. There are currently some reasons for supposing that incidental and 
intentional binding might reflect at least partially distinct processes. Dissociations 
between a bottom-up, perceptually-based kind of binding and top-down association 
learning have been observed (Colzato, Raffone, & Hommel, 2006). A distinction is 
sometimes made between grouping and unitization, where grouping refers to explicit 
formation of associations and unitization refers to implicit representation (Graf & 
Schacter, 1989). Explicit memory for binding is thought by some to rely on recollective 
processes, rather than familiarity (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008; Yonelinas, 
2002), and recollection is thought to reflect controlled processes (Jacoby, 1991) rather 
than automatic ones. 
Assuming this is accurate, then it is difficult to say what behaviors Prabhakaran et 
al. (2000) actually measured in their Bound task. Their results could reflect incidental 
binding of letter identities to their attended locations (Treisman & Zhang, 2006, who 
argue that such binding occurs), or their results could reflect intentional strategies 
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adopted by their participants to attend to and remember letter-location bindings. 
Differentiating between these possibilities is crucial if progress is to be made in 
understanding how and under what circumstances attention impacts memory for binding. 
Both Prabhakaran et al.’s behavioral results and neuroimaging results are puzzling if it is 
assumed that maintenance of binding was the unique difference between the Bound and 
Separate conditions. Behaviorally, binding conveyed little cognitive advantage; accuracy 
was significantly better in the Bound condition compared to the Separate, but only 
slightly so. Furthermore, recent neuroimaging evidence is inconsistent with assumptions 
about storage of letter-location binding arising from Prabhakaran et al.’s research. 
Prabhakaran et al. suggested that their unique anterior PFC activation reflected a working 
memory store capable of maintaining cross-domain object representations. However, 
subsequent event-related studies of anterior PFC function, which are better able to isolate 
activation due to storage rather than other cognitive processes, have not implicated the 
anterior PFC in storage operations (Campo et al., 2005; DePisapia, Slomski, & Braver, 
2007), suggesting that any differences between the Bound and Separate tasks in 
Prabhakaran et al.’s study might not have been attributable to the unique use of a domain-
general store in the Bound condition.  
 The following experiment was carried out to replicate the behavioral findings of 
Prabhakaran et al. (2000) and to examine how explicit instructions to remember binding 
might affect memory for letters, spatial locations, and their binding. Participants 
completed three letter and location memory tasks. Two of these tasks were constructed to 
be similar to the Separate and Bound conditions of Prabhakaran et al. (referred to here as 
Separate Presentation and Bound Presentation). In a third task, (called Binding 
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Recognition), letters were presented in locations as in the Bound Presentation task, but 
participants were instructed to respond affirmatively to a letter-location probe only if the 
letter and location were presented together at study. Therefore, in the Binding 
Recognition task, memory for binding was necessary for making a correct response 
whereas in the Bound Presentation task, an accurate response was possible without 
explicit memory for binding. 
 Possibly, simply presenting features in Bound format provides genuine behavioral 
advantages compared to presenting features in the disconnected, Separate format. If so, 
this experiment will help to elucidate those advantages. However, it is also important to 
know whether top-down attention to binding qualitatively changes the memory 
representation, possibly conveying different advantages or incurring different costs. 
Much recent research on binding makes use of methods similar to Prabhakaran’s, with 
binding manipulated through stimulus presentation only (e.g., Elsley & Parmentier, 2009; 
Guérard, Tremblay, & Saint-Aubin, 2009). Inference will sometimes depend on knowing 
whether memory for binding was implicit or explicit, and if implicit, understanding how 
similar incidental and intentional memory for binding truly are. To better gauge how 
much information was maintained during binding compared with separate feature 
memory, I manipulated the amount of to-be-remembered information, varied from 3 
letters and locations, which is within typical estimates of working memory capacity 
(Cowan, 2001) to 5 letters and locations, which should slightly exceed working memory 
capacity (at least for spatial locations or letter-location objects). Remembering these 
features as bound objects instead of separate features should decrease the effect of 
increasing the amount of to-be-remembered information. Differences between behavioral 
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performance during intentional versus incidental binding tasks, compared with 
performance during a task where binding is implausible, may be taken to reflect whether 
binding, or at least the same kind of binding, is really occurring in these conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-three students enrolled at the University of Groningen participated. The 
data of two participants were excluded due to chance responding in at least one task, 
leaving N=31 (9 males and 22 females, 20-26 years old). 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 Stimuli for each trial were randomly selected without replacement from 
predetermined sets. Letters (B, F, G, H, J, M, Q, R, T, L) were chosen to minimize 
phonological confusability and because upper- and lower-case exemplars were not 
visually identical in Times New Roman font. Ten locations were chosen from the 
perimeter of an imaginary ellipse centered on the screen. The centers of each location 
were ≥2 cm apart. All locations fell between pixels 398-622 horizontally and 309-457 
vertically on a 1024x768 display, enabling participants to see all stimuli at once from a 
distance of approximately 50 cm. 
 Stimuli were controlled using E-Prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). Responses were collected with Psychology Software Tools response boxes. 
Tasks and Procedure 
 Participants completed 3 randomly-ordered tasks, each beginning with practice 
trials (with 3 items) supervised by an experimenter. Correct responses on at least 5 
practice trials were necessary to begin the experimental trials. Participants could repeat 
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the practice session indefinitely, but most participants (N=18) never needed to repeat, and 
of those remaining, only two ever required more than one repetition of a practice block. 
These criteria ensured that participants understood the differences between instructions 
for each task, so that simple misunderstanding could not adequately explain accuracy 
differences between tasks. 
 Separate Presentation. In the Separate Presentation task upper-case letters were 
presented in a centered row and locations indicated with unfilled circles surrounding the 
letters (see Panel A of Figure 1). Participants were to consider whether the probe letter 
had been present and whether the probe location had been occupied, and reject the probe 
if either of these conditions were not met. At test, letter and location probes could be 
presented unbound (letter probe presented at the center of the screen and location probe 
presented as an unfilled circle) or their presentation could be bound (letter presented at a 
stimulus location, within a circle). When the probe appeared in bound format, this task 
replicated the Separate trials of Prabhakaran et al. (2000).  
Bound Presentation. In the Bound Presentation task upper-case letters were 
displayed within circles representing spatial locations (see Panel B of Figure 1). The 
instructions for responding were the same as in the Separate Presentation task. The probe 
letter and location could appear in bound or unbound format. When the probe appeared in 
bound format, this task replicated the Bound trials of Prabhakaran et al. (2000), and like 
theirs, resulted in the presence of both congruent and recombined targets.   
Binding Recognition task. Verbal and spatial stimuli were presented exactly as 
described for the Bound Presentation task. However in the Binding Recognition task, 
participants were instructed to reject a probe that included a letter and a spatial location 
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that were not bound together during study. As in the Separate Presentation and Bound 
Presentation blocks, probe stimuli could appear in unbound or bound format.  
In all tasks, proportions of targets and lures were equal. Lure types also occurred 
in equal proportions within each task block. All tasks included letter and location lures, 
which included one familiar feature from the study display and one unstudied feature. 
The Bound Presentation task included two types of targets (in equal proportions), 
congruent targets in which the letter and location were bound together at study and 
recombined targets, in which the tested letter and location were both present at study but 
were not bound together. In the Binding Recognition task, a probe with a letter and 
location that were present but not bound together at study was a recombination lure. The 
Separate and Bound Presentation blocks contained 64 trials each (32 targets and 32 lures, 
with equal proportions letter and location lures), and the Binding Recognition block 
contained 96 trials (48 targets and 48 lures, with equal proportions recombination, letter, 
and location lures), so that both the number of letter and location lures and the overall 
proportions of lures and targets was constant across tasks. 
Procedure. Instructions emphasized accuracy over speed, and these instructions 
were reinforced by requiring performance to a criterion during the practice session. Trial 
events are represented in Figure 1. The participant initiated a trial by pressing the button 
on the response box marked Next. A fixation “+” appeared for 1000 ms, followed by the 
study presentation, which remained onscreen for 1500 ms for 3 letters and 3 locations, or 
2500 ms for 5 letters and locations in order to keep encoding time per object constant. 
After a blank 5000-ms retention interval, a probe letter and location appeared, and 
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remained until the participant responded by pressing the button labeled Yes for a target or 
the button labeled No for a lure. 
Analyses  
My analysis of these data occurs in two parts. In the first, I sought to replicate the 
findings of Prabhakaran et al. (2000), especially the latency differences they uncovered in 
the Bound Presentation task. I therefore conducted comparisons between the Separate 
and Bound Presentation tasks on both accuracy and latency data, and compared probe 
conditions within the Bound Presentation task. I also compared overall discrimination 
and correct rejections of lures across all three tasks, to determine whether behavioral 
performance during a letter-location memory task that affords binding is more similar to 
performance on a letter-location memory task that does not afford binding or more 
similar to an explicit letter-location binding task. Because of near-ceiling performance in 
some experimental conditions, arcsine transformations were applied to proportions 
correct before inferential analyses (though mean proportions correct are reported for ease 
of interpretation). Whenever ANOVA assumptions of sphericity were violated, the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. The threshold for declaring statistical 
significance was always p<.05.  
After an initial analysis, I excluded the unbound probe trials from further analysis, 
in order to simplify the report of results. Contrary to my expectations, the effect of this 
manipulation did not significantly differ between the Separate and Bound Presentation 
tasks (Task x Probe format, p=.26). I chose to report results for only the bound probes, so 
as to remain consistent with Prabhakaran et al.’s (2000) design, but collapsing across 
probe format reveals results similar to the ones I report. 
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Results  
Does incidental binding occur when stimuli afford it?  
Is there strong evidence of binding during the Bound Presentation task, as 
Prabhakaran et al. (2000) argued? This could manifest itself as more accurate responses 
in the Bound than in the Separate Presentation task, which Prabhakaran et al observed. 
Mean proportions correct for all tasks and conditions are given in Table 1. A 3-way 
ANOVA including task (Bound Presentation and Separate Presentation), probe 
condition (target, letter lure, or location lure), and set size (3 or 5) revealed significant 
main effects of probe condition (F(2,60)=40.88, MSE=.16, ηp2=.58), and set size 
(F(1,30)=16.30, MSE=.07, ηp2=.35). The effect of task did not reach criterion for 
statistical significance (p=.07), and neither did any interactions (ps between .08 and .30). 
The difference between overall accuracy in the Bound (M=.84, SEM=.01) and the 
Separate Presentation tasks (M=.81, SEM=.01) was comparable to that observed by  
Prabhakaran et al (.885 for Bound and .857 for Separate, with 4-item displays). One 
might also ask whether judgments were more accurate for congruent than recombined 
targets in the Bound Presentation task. An advantage for congruent targets would be 
consistent with the assumption that incidental binding occurred in the Bound 
Presentation task. A 2-way ANOVA including each probe condition (congruent target, 
recombined target, letter lure, or location lure) and set size of arcsine-transformed 
proportions correct in the Bound Presentation task showed a main effect of probe 
condition (F(3,90)=15.35, MSE=.14, ηp2=.34), but a Bonferroni-corrected comparison 
between congruent targets (M=.89, SEM=.03) and recombined targets (M=.82, SEM=.03) 
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was non-significant (p=.45). A main effect of set size was also observed (F(1,30)=19.74, 
MSE=.05, ηp2=.40); their interaction was non-significant (p=.30). 
Prabhakaran et al.’s strongest evidence came from latency differences, 
particularly between the congruent and incongruent targets in the Bound Presentation 
task. Trimmed mean response times for correct responses only are given in Table 2 
(N=28 after trimming). Correct responses faster than 300 ms and slower than 7000 ms 
(more than 5 SDs from the mean, < 2% of all responses) were excluded. First a 3-way 
ANOVA performed on trimmed mean response times with task (Separate Presentation, 
Bound Presentation), set size (3, 5), and probe condition (targets, letter lures, location 
lures) was carried out to examine any differences between the Separate Presentation and 
Bound Presentation tasks that might reflect incidental binding in the Bound Presentation 
task. No main effect of task (p=.995) or any significant interactions between the task 
factor and other variables were observed (ps from .35-.93), which might have reflected 
incidental binding in the Bound Presentation task. A separate 2-way ANOVA of the 
Bound Presentation task only, with set size and probe condition (congruent targets, 
recombined targets, letter lures, and location lures) as factors, was carried out in a further 
search for evidence that incidental binding might have occurred when it was afforded. 
Main effects of set size (F(1,27)=16.22, MSE=242214, ηp2=.38) and probe condition 
(F(3,81)=6.30, MSE=371307, ηp2=.19) were found (no significant interaction, p=.41). In 
this analysis, the main evidence for binding observed by Prabhakaran et al. was clearly 
replicated: recombined targets (M=2251, SEM=148) produced significantly slower 
responses than in all other conditions, including congruent targets (M=1829, SEM=93).  
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In the Bound Presentation task, for which binding was possible but not necessary, 
modest evidence for incidental binding was observed. Specifically, response times to 
congruent targets were faster than to recombined targets. However, if incidental binding 
occurred and conveyed behavioral advantages supposedly associated with binding, one 
might also have expected interactions between task and other variables, possibly set size, 
indicating that more information was maintained during binding memory than during 
dual-feature memory. These interactions never reached statistical significance. Even 
overall differences in accuracy between the Bound and Separate Presentation tasks did 
not significantly differ, though the size of the difference between these conditions was 
similar to the statistically significant difference observed by Prabhakaran et al. (2000). 
Considering the entire pattern of comparisons between the Separate and Bound 
Presentation tasks, bound presentation did not afford much of an advantage. To consider 
whether the assumption that binding should afford behavioral advantages is reasonable, I 
next compare performance on the Binding Recognition task with performance on the 
Separate and Bound Presentation tasks. 
Does intentional memory for binding differ from incidental memory for binding? 
How does discrimination in the Binding Recognition task, in which binding 
maintenance was an explicit task goal, compare with that of the Separate Presentation 
and Bound Presentation tasks? In order to fairly compare across all three tasks, which 
each had the same 50/50 division of targets and lures but different definitions of what 
constituted a target or lure, nonparametric A’ values were calculated. A’ models 
discrimination, correcting for response biases, but imposes no other assumptions on the 
values (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Assuming performance is better than chance, 
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€ 
" A = 12 +
(H − F)(1+ H − F)
4H(1− F)       (1) 
where H equals the hit rate, or the proportion of correct responses to targets, and F equals 
false alarm rate, or the proportion of incorrect responses to lures. A’ values were entered 
into a 2-way ANOVA, with task (Binding Recognition, Bound Presentation, or Separate 
Presentation) and set size as factors. Significant main effects of task (F(2,60)=10.15, 
MSE=.01, ηp2=.25) and set size (F(1,30)=9.03, MSE=.01, ηp2=.23) were observed; their 
interaction was non-significant (p=.17).  Discrimination was significantly higher in the 
Binding Recognition task (M=.94, SEM=.01) than in both the Separate Presentation task 
(M=.87, SEM=.02) and the Bound Presentation task (M=.91, SEM=.01); Bonferroni-
corrected comparisons between Bound Presentation and Separate Presentation (p=.08) 
were non-significant.  
Lures that included one studied feature and one new feature occurred across all 
tasks, enabling some direct comparisons of proportions correct across tasks. A 3-way 
ANOVA with task, set size, and lure type (letter or location lure) as factors uncovered 
significant main effects of task (F(2,60)=11.10, MSE=.09, ηp2=.27), set size 
(F(1,30)=6.53, MSE=.08, ηp2=.18), and lure type (F(1,30)=105.50, MSE=.12, ηp2=.78). A 
significant 2-way interaction between task and set size (F(2,60)=3.39, MSE=.06, ηp2=.10) 
qualifies these effects, providing a possible explanation of improved discrimination 
observed in the Binding Recognition task. This pattern is depicted in Figure 2. In the 
Separate and Bound Presentation tasks, recognition typically decreased as set size 
increased, but in the Binding Recognition task, recognition of lures did not decrease as set 
size increased. This interaction suggests that intentional binding might enhance memory 
for the features being bound. The effect is clearest for the location lures (i.e., old letters 
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presented in new locations), though the 3-way interaction between task, set size, and lure 
type which would show that the same pattern does not hold for letter lures does not reach 
the criterion for statistical significance (p=.065). Morey (2009) showed a similar 
advantage for letter lures, which might arise if participants remember the all letter 
identities on a trial. This is certainly plausible for displays of 3-5 letters, considering that 
working memory capacity for verbal lists tends to be higher than 5 (e.g., Miller, 1956). 
Discussion 
 Intentionally encoding verbal-spatial relationships seemed to bring about a 
substantial improvement in accuracy of responses, compared with responses in a similar 
task which only afforded a possibility to maintain bindings, but did not actually require 
maintenance of bindings. Though some evidence of binding was observed in the Bound 
Presentation task, comparable to the Bound condition of Prabhakaran et al. (2000), 
discrimination accuracy in this task did not show the same pattern of improvement with 
respect to a Separate memory task as responses in the Binding Recognition task. 
Evidence for improved recognition under binding instructions does not depend on a 
simple main effect, which might be interpreted as reflecting a generic increase in effort 
during the Binding Recognition block1. Instead, an interaction between task instructions 
and set size suggests that intentionally maintaining binding may enhance memory for 
                                                
1 One could argue that the Binding Recognition task required more effort than the others because more 
information was to-be-remembered. One could as easily argue that the Bound and Separate Presentation 
tasks required more effort because two judgments were necessary on every trial, whereas in the Binding 
Recognition task, it was possible to consider the decision at probe one judgment. At the end of each session, 
participants were asked to indicate which task they found most fatiguing and most difficult. More 
participants found the Bound Presentation task to be most fatiguing (N=13) and most difficult (N=17) than 
the Binding Recognition task (Ns=11 and 6 respectively). One should not draw serious conclusions from 
participant’s perceptions of their performance, which could be influenced by their perceived accuracy in 
each task or even mis-remembered, but note that these responses are at least inconsistent with the 
assumption that participants felt that the binding instructions added an extra cognitive burden.   
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component features themselves and help to preserve discrimination accuracy as 
information load increases.  
 These results, along with similar findings examining binding between visual 
features (Colzato et al., 2006) and between verbal items (Graf & Schacter, 1989) are 
consistent with a dissociation between the processes underlying incidental and intentional 
binding. This body of research suggests that, whatever the modality of the to-be-
remembered stimuli, binding can occur on multiple levels, perhaps according to the 
suggestion of Colzato et al., that binding first occurs as a temporary link between 
activated features, and can become a more stable, integrated representation. A similar 
reconciling hypothesis was suggested by Wheeler and Treisman (2002) to explain why 
they observed a cost for remembering multi-feature visual objects, contrary to the results 
of Luck and Vogel (1997). The present research suggests that the process of forming a 
stable representation does not occur automatically; rather, attention to feature association 
during encoding plays an important role in facilitating the formation of a stable object 
representation. However, this study does not eliminate the possibility that some initial 
link between activated features occurs automatically. Distinguishing between these levels 
of binding might explain why binding is sometimes unimpaired by concurrent tasks (as in 
Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006; Allen, Hitch, & Baddeley, 2009). If some binding 
occurs automatically, participants in tasks with very short retention intervals might rely 
more on these temporary representations, which are believed to either remain intact for as 
long as 5000 ms or vanish completely from memory (Zhang & Luck, 2009). In the 
present study, memoranda were tested after a 5000-ms delay, thus instructions to 
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maintain and recognize binding might have been further reinforced by the need to 
maintain the representation over several seconds.  
However, it is also possible that the modest evidence for binding in the Bound 
Presentation task reflects intentional binding on the part of a sub-set of participants. The 
possibility that only some participants adopt an explicit binding strategy is a serious 
problem for interpreting the results of implicit tests of memory for binding. In at least one 
instance, performing a concurrent task has been shown to impair binding measured 
implicitly with a task similar to Prabhakaran et al.’s (2000). Elsley and Parmentier (2009) 
compared response times for congruent and incongruent targets during performance of a 
concurrent task, and found that compared to single-task performance, performing a 
secondary tone memory task eliminated any implicit evidence of binding memory. As in 
the Prabhakaran et al. study, this design limits the inferences that can be made about the 
nature of cross-domain binding, because it is impossible to know whether participants 
intentionally encoded letter-location associations. These results could be taken as 
evidence that even incidental cross-domain binding requires attention, but it could also 
have been the case that the observed binding effect was due to an intentional binding 
strategy adopted by a sub-set of the sample, and that this process was affected by a 
concurrent, attention-demanding task. Using implicit measures of binding, it is 
impossible to distinguish between these possibilities, but using explicit measures of 
binding, such a comparison would be possible. 
Prabhakaran et al.’s (2000) demonstration of cross-domain binding provided 
strong support for Baddeley’s proposal of a domain-general, attention-driven episodic 
buffer (Baddeley, 2000). The results of the present research support some domain-general, 
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attentional component in working memory (or alternatively a unitary working memory 
model, such as that of Cowan (2005) or Jones, Beaman, & Macken (1996)) even more 
strongly. The finding that performance does not decrease at set size 5 for bound 
representations is consistent with the idea that as these features are grouped, more 
features may be maintained for the same cognitive cost. This is exactly what should 
happen if a domain-general store maintains stable representations of bound objects, or 
chunks of grouped features, (Cowan, 2001), and is consistent with Baddeley’s hypotheses 
about how information is maintained by the episodic buffer (Repovš & Baddeley, 2006), 
namely that attentional resources should be required either for integrating feature 
information, maintaining representations, or both. This pattern was only observed when 
binding was necessary for successful task completion, not when binding was merely 
possible. This strongly suggests that the application of attention is necessary for these 
cognitive advantages to appear. Concurrently-presented verbal and spatial stimuli can 
also be maintained separately, not necessarily as bound object representations (Cowan et 
al., 2006; Morey, 2009); to observe the expected cognitive advantages of binding, it is 
necessary to foster circumstances that demand or reward explicit memory for binding, 
rather than rely on participants to voluntarily adopt a strategy of attending to bindings 
afforded at stimulus presentation.   
In conclusion, measures of incidental binding do not seem to reflect potential 
cognitive advantages of encoding features as bound objects. Measures of incidental 
binding might reflect somewhat different processes than measures of intentional binding, 
but because implicit tests of binding allow for multiple strategies, it is difficult to 
Intentional Binding in WM 20 
unambiguously interpret the results of these tests. One solution to these difficulties is to 
measure binding explicitly.  
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Table 1 
 
Separate Presentation Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
Targets   .79 (.19) .77(.22) 
Letter Lures   .98 (.06) .94 (.13)   
 Location Lures  .74 (.23) .65 (.25)   
Bound Presentation Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
 Congruent Targets  .94 (.14) .86 (.20) 
 Recombined Targets  .87 (.22) .81 (.22) 
 Letter Lures   .96 (.09) .94 (.15) 
 Location Lures  .79 (.27) .64 (.23) 
Binding Recognition Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
 Targets   .90 (.12) .87 (.12) 
 Recombined Lures  .91 (.17) .89 (.20) 
 Letter Lures   1.00 (.00) .98 (.06) 
 Location Lures  .82 (.22) .87 (.18)   
Note. Mean proportions correct (with standard deviations) for each task, by probe 
condition and set size. N=31. 
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Table 2 
Separate Presentation Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
Targets   1972 (641) 2060(616)  
Letter Lures   1652 (561) 1847 (697)    
 Location Lures  1711 (550) 2168 (865)   
Bound Presentation Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
Congruent Targets  1802 (594) 1856 (563) 
Recombined Targets  2071 (666) 2432 (1084)     
Letter Lures   1659 (593) 2011 (962)   
 Location Lures  1722 (496) 2015 (743)   
Binding Recognition Task        
     Set Size 3 Set Size 5   
Targets   1581 (436) 1786 (411) 
Recombined Lures  1916 (513) 2057 (723)     
Letter Lures   1399 (345) 1547 (413)   
 Location Lures  1566 (371) 1845 (448)     
Note. Mean trimmed response times in ms (with standard deviations) for each task, probe 
condition, and set size. Incorrect responses and correct responses faster than 300 ms and 
slower than 7000 ms were excluded from analyses. N=28. Participants with no data in 
any cell after trimming were excluded list-wise as in the corresponding analyses of 
variance.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Trial events for the A) Separate Presentation, B) Bound Presentation and 
Binding Recognition tasks. The probes in the Separate Presentation procedure are targets. 
In the Bound Presentation procedure, the probes would be targets in the Bound 
Presentation task (recombined targets) and recombined lures in the Binding Recognition 
task. On trials with 5 letters and locations, the study display remained onscreen for 2500 
ms. 
Figure 2. Proportions correct on lure trials in which one feature at test was new. Explicit 
binding instructions seem to protect against committing false alarms to location lures, as 
evinced by the comparatively strong performance on location lures in the Binding 
Recognition Task. N=31, error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
